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Abstract
The article provides an ethnographic study of the lives of the ‘dangerous class’ of
drug users based on fieldwork carried out among different drug using ‘communities’
in Tehran between 2012 and 2016. The primary objective is to articulate the
presence of this category within modern Iran, its uses and its abuses in relation to
the political. What drives the narration is not only the account of this lumpen,
plebeian group vis a` vis the state, but also the way power has affected their agency,
their capacity to be present in the city, and how capital/power and the dangerous/
lumpen life come to terms, to conflict, and to the production of new situations
which affect urban life.
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Prologue. To Burn, Burn, Burn in Farahzad Valley
Out from their mothers’ womb
They found themselves on the walkway or in prehistoric
lawns, signed up in registries
that want them ignored by all history. . .
(Pier Paolo Pasolini, La religione del mio tempo [The Religion of My Time], 1959)
Under the highway bridges of Teheran’s ever-expanding urban landscape or in the
alleys and backstreets of its popular neighbourhoods, a spectre is haunting the
respectable middle-class and, with it, the state: the spectre of the ‘addict’.1
Riding to the end of a slope in a collective taxi, I get out of the car and ask
for directions of a middle-aged woman with a loaf of lavash bread walking down
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the road. ‘Salam, khaste´ nabashid! Do you know where the shelter for homeless
people is in Farahzad?’2 It takes a few moments for her to register the question.
‘Do you mean the addicts’ refuge [panahgah-e mo’tadan]? That one is at the very
end of the road on your right-hand side, before the darre´ [valley]. Mind what you’re
doing, it’s not a place to go.’ On my way I see several men, with worn-out clothes,
picking up rubbish from the ground and stuffing it in huge fibre bags, which they
carry on their backs. They seem to me the urban equivalent of the nankhoshki, the
dry bread collectors that up until recently animated the morning wake-up of many
Iranian towns. The men on this road do not use the rhythmic cry ‘nunkhoshke´,
nunkhoshke´’ of the bread collectors. They do not collect dry bread for husbandry
but the city’s waste to sustain a chronic dependence on heroin or methampheta-
mine (locally known as shisheh, ‘glass’).
These garbage collectors walk around furtively; their presence evidently
bothers the neighbourhood residents, who belong to the white-collar middle
class. Following this flow of collectors up the road, I end up in an open green
space which is just south of the Emamzadeh Davoud, an old shrine in North
Tehran. It is one of Tehran’s ancient mahalle´, neighbourhoods, part of the
Shemiranat district. The shrine hosts one of the countless descendants of the
Shi’a Imams, who is thought to have arrived in the area with the Eighth Imam,
Imam Reza, whose mausoleum sits in Mashhad, the capital of Khorasan, in North-
Eastern Iran. So, on one side of the valley there is the shrine and on the other a
shelter for homeless drug users. The body and the spirit of Tehranis find solace in
their own ways.
Most of those frequenting this patoq, ‘hangout’, do not live in the neighbour-
hood, although there are locals who spend their evenings there (Figure 3). Better
prices, steady availability and less variable quality guarantee a better consumer
experience even in the face of the sheer degradation that the patoq’s setting show-
cases. The Farahzad Valley (darreh-ye Farahzad), where the shelter is located, has
become a notorious site of drug use and open drug dealing in the last decade
following the arrests and clampdowns in other areas of Tehran. Journalists have
named it ‘The Autonomous Area of Farahzad’, while the police have attempted,
for some time, unsuccessfully to bust the drug lord of Farahzad, Said Sahne´,
allegedly one of the biggest in town (Tabnak, 2013). Police operations, with the
intention of clamping down on drug users’ gatherings in more visible areas of the
city, drove flows of drug users to this traditional neighbourhood. In turn, the area
became a successful market of narcotics and stimulant distributions, connecting the
traditional crime-ridden districts of the south – notorious for drug dealing (as I
describe later) – with the westernised bourgeois north.
Practically, Farahzad Valley’s drug scene is made up of numerous patoqs
(Figure 1–2). The one closest to the shrine is Chehel Pelleh, the ‘Forty Steps’,
which sits at the bottom of an old staircase – once made up of 40 steps, today
mostly a remnant of bricks and clay. It is known as the biggest of all hotspots in the
area. The bustling is continuous with some arriving from the main road from the
closer residential complex and others descending from the shrine’s neighbourhood.
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Strategically located, the site remains insular from the main roads and, therefore,
from the police. It operates in an economy of its own:
On flat ground surrounded by trees and streams of water lies the ‘high street’ of
the patoq. A home-made wooden desk is placed on the muddy route, with a man
dispensing different cuts of aluminium paper and various models of lighters.
He sells the paraphernalia necessary for heroin smoking, for the modest price of
one to two thousand tuman (ca. £0.50).3 On the other side, there is the tarazudar,
the ‘weight-scaler man’ who is the person in charge of drug dealing, especially
quantities exceeding the single dose. The tarazudar dispenses heroin, a substance
in vogue in Tehran since the late 1950s (Ghiabi, 2018c), and methamphetamine
(shisheh), the stimulant drug which had become popular since the mid-2000s. The
main stash of drugs, I’m told, is secreted in several places by the local boss. In case
of police raid, which is not an unforeseeable occurrence, the main dealer has the
option of running away (e.g. motorbikes, hide-outs in the neighbourhood) or of
hiding in the crowd of other drug users. In the latter scenario, he risks being
arrested but avoids being recognised as a dealer. He steers clear of the risk of
draconian penalties for dealing, which in Iran ultimately included execution up
until 2017.
Security in the patoq is guaranteed by a number of gardan kolofts, ‘roughnecks’
who act as vigilantes in the drug hotspot. They consist of look-outs, informers, but
also enforcers of the local order. They carry clubs and knifes but no gun, at least
Figure 1. Chehel Pelleh. Photo by author.
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according to the widespread belief of those in the surroundings. The boss of the
patoq pays them a daily wage for their services, mostly in the form of drugs, which
they re-sell, or limited monetary compensation, or a combination of both.
Strangers are dissuaded from passing through the patoq for fear of being taken
for undercover cops or informants. This applies at times also to humanitarian
groups, such as outreach activists who provide clean needles, condoms and primary
healthcare to the people there. On one occasion, following an earlier police busting
operation in the area, one of the vigilantes threw a heavy wooden club at me from
uphill shouting ‘boro gomsho ****!’, ‘get lost, ****!’. Suspicion and distrust
towards strangers is the rule, a fact that undermines also health initiatives
among people using drugs, especially injectors and sex workers (Figure 2).
The reason why HIV prevention activities are often rejected was, in the words of
one of the bosses, ‘because here in Chehel Pelle´, we don’t have them! Tazriqi
nadarim, we don’t have injecting drug users, we don’t want them, they are dirty.
We are clean. Here is a clean space!’ Perplexed about his statement, he added: ‘Go
to the patoq Mohammad Deraz, you can give this stuff [clean needles, etc.] there,
una` tazrighian, they’re injectors!’ Yet HIV is rampant in these sites and mobility
between different hotspots increases the chances of transmission of diseases,
Figure 2. Harm reduction in Farahzad Valley. Photo by author.
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whether through shared injecting paraphernalia or sexual encounters. Keeping a
low profile, many drug users would approach those distributing clean needles to be
tested for HIV and hepatitis. They would usually walk away with half a dozen
clean syringes and a few condoms.
Within the patoqs, there is a social/ethical stratification. About 20 minutes’ walk
from Chehel Pelle´, there is Mohammad Deraz patoq (Tall Mohammad), named
after a local dealer who, according to the local myth, was very tall. The atmosphere
in this patoq is more relaxed compared to that of Chehel Pelleh; there is a combin-
ation of people from different social backgrounds, men and women, and in general
younger people. But not only young people frequent the enclave; it also functions
as a tented encampment. It is there that I encountered Fereshteh and her boyfriend.
A young couple covered in dirt, with soot-streaked faces, sat in front of a small
blue tent. I met them around 10am while they were smoking heroin on a piece of
aluminium. ‘They had just woken up and were preparing their breakfast’ explained
Hamid, the person who introduced me to them. Fereshteh welcomes me with a big
smile which reveals the poor state of her teeth. Her lips are dark of the smoke of the
opiate and her face swollen. She must be no older than 25, I thought. After the
mutual presentations she offers me an apple, as per courtesy in Iranian culture –
and regardless of the destitution in which she and everyone there lived, insists that I
must have something while we sit together. So we split the apple in two and we eat
it; her boyfriend declines to share it out of courtesy. ‘We have less than nothing and
that is all I can offer you’, and taking up the aluminium Fereshteh says, ‘Not to be
impolite: befarma! Help yourself if you please!’ I decline her kind offer of heroin,
saying that I’m OK with the apple. She asks me whether I am a recovered addict,
because ‘you look good’, ‘you’re healthy’ and ‘it’s evident you’re in a good state’.
Then she adds, ‘Wow, I haven’t talked to a non-addict for such a long time, it is so
nice to speak to people who are not addicts. Here everyone is an addict; everyone
uses drugs or is in recovery or has been addicted. All NGO workers, too, are
former addicts, they all hung out here with us up until recently [while nodding
towards Hamid, the NGO worker].’ She chases the dragon, inhales it through
a tube and concludes, ‘It’s been three years since I spoke to someone who is not
an addict’.
Fereshteh has tried to ‘get clean’ several times. Earlier that year, she signed up in
a methadone clinic, which happened to be near the shrine uphill, managed by a
philanthropic doctor who provides free-of-charge services. She had felt awful,
thought of dying and that is, she continues, because her drug of choice is not
heroin – and she says so while holding some in her hand – but shisheh (meth).
Methadone, the legal substitute for opiates, does not work for her; ‘I need energy
and speed, otherwise I starve’. Her heroin use is to relax and have a sound sleep:
‘mesl-e takh bekhabam’, and take away her body pain: ‘dardam bicharam kard’. So
she does heroin when she wakes up and before going to sleep. Shisheh keeps her
going while at work and hustling. And, ‘for pleasure’.4
She has lived in the tent with her boyfriend for more than a year. Her look is
that of a sick, dirty and dishevelled person. He sells ‘used’ stuff and stolen goods
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while she collects garbage and recycles old clothes. They are not married but they
live together. Their existence parallels the ‘white marriages’ of many young urban
couples who, not ready for the formalities and commitments (including financial
and of housing) of de jure marriage, opt for informal arrangements, by living
under the same roof. This option, nonetheless, remains illegal and repressed –
haphazardly – by state authorities (The Guardian, 2015). For Fereshteh this is
the least of her troubles. Her boyfriend sells used mobile phones and does petty
drug dealing around town. He has been in and out of treatment centres, but with
no success. Fereshteh collects garbage – one of the few female collectors I met –
and, when desperate, she begs. ‘We want to get back our lives and return to society.
Pray for us! Three years ago I used to study and go to school and now I’m in
this. . .’. She is suddenly interrupted by her boyfriend, ‘Careful! You’re on fire!’.
Fereshteh looks at me for a second or two, evidently on the heroin high, smiles and
replies, while taking off her hood, ‘puff, if I were at home I would be screaming like
crazy here and there. Here, it doesn’t matter, it’s like this, we live like this, it’s
normal. We set ourselves on fire!’
Her hood had caught fire while she was lighting up some heroin. A few metres
away, later in the day, I encounter an old man – or perhaps a 40-year-old who
looks 70 – whose tent was burnt to ashes. His response, aware that all he had was
now up in smoke, is emblematic of lumpen life on drugs, ‘It doesn’t matter, it’s a
sadagheye khoda, a charity for God, it saved my life, if only I were there asleep in
the tent now, I’d be dead.’ The old man and Fereshteh don’t care about burning
their stuff to ashes, because, after all, life on the road is, to borrow from Jack
Kerouac, to burn, burn, burn (Kerouac, 2002: 6).
Vocabulary of Situations
Such is the situation at work in drug wars against the dangerous classes of the
addicts. Drug wars, in the first place, take the form of powerful criminalisation of
individuals’ drug consumption. Prohibition is the ideological frame that governs
drug wars and that, ultimately, produces spaces of repression and isolation, in the
forms of prisons or under the bridges of drug ghettos. These spaces of destitution
with their local distinctions across the globe are bearers of similar semantic traits
(Bourgois, 2003; Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009; Fernandes, 2002; Ghiabi, 2018a).
In Iran, addiction defines the poor categorically. In Tehran alone there are
around 15,000 homeless people, with the number changing according to the sea-
sonal migration from the hinterland. This migration is driven partly by the search
for a living and the promise of higher revenues in the capital Tehran; but it is also
the result of seasonal climate. The southern hinterland has a climate that is hardly
tolerable for homeless and vagrant people in the summer, whereas Tehran, situated
1000m above sea level, has milder summer nights, which makes it ideal for open-air
sleeping. This works also the other way round: Tehran’s snowy and cold winters
compel large numbers of homeless vagrants to seek refuge in the milder climates of
the southern plateau. The migration to Tehran signifies the arrival of low-skilled
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cheap labour employed in desultory tasks, whereas in the south this prospect is
absent.
Overall, the number of homeless people addicted to drugs reaches 42,000 nation-
wide (ADNA, 2016), but this number is thought to be a conservative estimate. They
are called kartonkhab, ‘the cardboard-box sleepers’, velgard, ‘the vagrant’, bikhane-
man, ‘the homeless’, but the category through which they are governed is what the
police has named mo‘tadan-e porkhatar, ‘the dangerous addicts’. In fact, more than
80 per cent of the homeless population is, according to official sources (Mehr,
2016), addicted to illicit substances: heroin, meth, alcohol, morphine, methadone
and so on. A high incidence of HIV/AIDS (a blood-borne disease easily spread by
sharing injecting equipment) and sexually transmitted diseases (STD) have also
been revealed, despite this population remaining largely invisible or hidden in
the cityscape. Its ecology of existence is made up of the popular districts of the
south, the valleys and caves in the north, the undeveloped lands under the highway
bridges and, recently, the graveyards in the suburbs (Habibi and Ghiabi, 2017).
Following the opening ethnographic scene, the article provides an ethnographic
account of the lives the ‘dangerous class’ of street addicts based on fieldwork
carried out among different drug using ‘communities’ in Tehran between 2012
and 2016. It explores the themes highlighted in the opening ethnographic scene,
i.e. the place of homeless (dangerous) drug users; the structural violence of their
lives; and the political economy of lumpen existence. The primary objective is to
articulate the presence of this category within modern urban life, its uses and its
abuses in relation to power. What drives the narration is not only the account of
this lumpen, plebeian group vis-a`-vis the state, but also the way power has affected
their agency, their capacity to be present in the city, and how capital/power and the
dangerous/lumpen life come to terms, to conflict, and to the production of new
situations which affect urban life. The article also tackles the theoretical and his-
torical frame of reference upon which the narrative is built. This includes a glimpse
at the history of drug prohibition, its rationale and its connection to the category of
class, especially to that of lumpenproletariat and the dangerous poor. In this
attempt, one can bridge the hermeneutic gap in the study of the non-western
world, where the category of ‘dangerous class’ was first enunciated. It connects
the lives of cities across the Global North and South, through in-depth description
of lumpen situations the reader is invited to ‘see’ how categories born out of socio-
logical analysis in other times and spaces can be at work, productively, in new
contexts. The intent is to add not simply to the knowledge of new historical, ethno-
graphic cases, but to enrich the understanding of the category of the ‘lumpen’ and
dangerous class.
My encounter with the individuals described in this article occurred during an
extended fieldwork project carried out in the city of Tehran. Comprehensive and
synthetic elements of the experience of homeless drug users is narrated through
dense ethnographic cases (Javad, Fereshteh, Mohsen, Hamid, Reza and Ali), built
on personal immersion in their life settings, including dozen visits to the patoqs,
‘deep hanging out’ (Geertz, 1998) in the public and casual but sustained chats while
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strolling in the city or sat in proximity of their ‘private’ dwellings. Observation of
the setting landscapes and the way it was transformed in the passing of time (from
2012 to 2016) also informed my ethnographic analysis. Although I am aware this is
not exhaustive – as all generalisation betrays ethnographic details – the description
of events, settings and modes of existence mirror recurring traits in the drug-using
communities I had the chance to study during my fieldwork. Contacts with
individuals occurred also while I volunteered with harm reduction outreach pro-
grammes in Tehran. Meetings occurred both during outreach programmes and
outside those settings.5
The structural violence of lumpen life
The lives of lumpen drug users have become the object of structural violence
produced by capitalist forms of government and exploitation (Singer and Page,
2016: 153; Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009; Bourgois, 2003). This violence is both
physical and symbolic as it operates through mass incarceration of minorities and
the marginal, police killings and large-scale substance abuse as well as violence
against these communities through the ideology of ‘individual achievement and free
market efficiency’ (Bourgois, 2011: 7; Garcia, 2010). While spatial segregation, in
the forms of prison or the poor people’s ghetto, impedes human development
through the exclusion of the working class and the undeserving poor – like home-
less drug users – from the mainstream economy, ideological exclusion condemns
them to a virtual oblivion. Communities depleted by the addiction and anti-nar-
cotic assemblage, the duo of chronic health shortcoming and selective judicial and
police targeting, go through a process of lumpenisation, which goes hand-in-hand
with the depoliticisation of unruly subjects in the city. Criminal records and spatial
confinement to urban neighbourhoods reputed as unhealthy and criminal become
thus a structural obstacle for seeking employment; drug offences make that task a
virtually impossible mission. A general look at the scholarly literature cited above
shows that this process is one of lumpenisation of plebeian classes and, from a
structural viewpoint, does not differ across the East and West, North and South
divide (Bourgois, 2018; Ghiabi, 2018b).
One cannot speak of ‘class’ in reference to drug users. The category of drug user
itself is an invention of a political machine which has listed certain substances and
plants as exceptional (poppy/opium, coca/cocaine, cannabis/marijuana for
instance), but regulated others (tobacco, alcohol) in a flourishing capitalist
market. This machine emerged in the first part of the 20th century concomitant
with state-led modernisation and through the influence of US anti-narcotic
discourse – though countries in the Global South and, especially, in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) developed their own prohibitionist vision of the
drug wars (Ghiabi, 2018e, Ghiabi et al., 2018). The drug ‘addict’ – to use the
lexicon of 20th-century drug wars – is neither part of the economic system of
production nor of its moral order. He or she is a parasite par excellence, because
in the popular imagination he/she remains useless – of no use. He/she relies on
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illegal income or on charity and is therefore a liability in the political economy of
development. Yet, chronic drug users – aka ‘addicts’ – are also avid consumers, the
nature of drug use being tied with chronic drug consumerism and the unending
search for money/capital. This inescapable drive for consumption is what makes
chronic drug users an essential identity/product of capitalist times. Therefore,
‘addicts’ are not a class, but a category that cuts across social classes and is instru-
mental in discriminating against the poor and the ethically underserving.
The experience of living under drug prohibition brings the wage labourers of
factories, farms and industries closer to the life of the wageless, the so-called people
of the ‘informal economy’. That levels the ground between proletariat and lump-
enproletariat. Michael Denning argues that ‘we must insist that ‘‘proletarian’’ is
not synonym for ‘‘wage labourer’’ but for dispossession, expropriation and radical
dependence on the market’ (Denning, 2010: 81), including the illegal drug market.
Dependence on the market defines the life of drug users in structural ways. The
wage labourer, in parallel, under a system where those consuming certain sub-
stances are objects of police repression, becomes what Marx called ‘a virtual
pauper’ (Marx, 1993, cited in Denning, 2010) for whom poverty is a reality in
waiting, likely but not necessarily inescapable.
Under this rationale, the figure of the ‘addict’ – its etymology reminding us of its
Latin root, addicere, ‘to enslave’, and particularly that of the homeless, street drug
user – establishes itself as a preeminent example of a class in dependency under
capitalist production; a class dangerous for its nature threatens bourgeois decorum
and in danger because it is at the mercy of class-based subjugation. Hence comes
the making of poor drug users into a ‘dangerous class’. Programmatically perceived
as a bearer of danger, disorder and irrational violence, its danger is manifested
through different concerns, which encompass and enmesh criminality, health, mor-
ality and middle-class prosperity – elements that emerged in the opening ethno-
graphic description. The danger, however, is binary: seen as socially dangerous and
political/ethical misfits, these are also categories in danger, because their life –
qualifying as ‘bare life’ (zoe¨ as opposed to bios; Agamben, 2010) – is disposable,
precarious, wasteful, contaminated. Their death, too, is bare, as it does not leave
public signs beyond statistical records (cf. Comaroff, 2007; Biehl, 2013).
This overlapping of medical, sociological, criminologist and political concerns is
a side-effect of the medicalisation of politics vis-a`-vis the categories of the deviant.
This process had among its founders the Italian physician (and ‘physiognomist’)
Cesare Lombroso, who first sought to preserve, on shaky medical grounds, the
healthy from the fool and the revolutionary (‘i mattoidi e rivoluzionari’) (Lombroso,
1896), an expedient to preserve the status quo and middle-class decency amidst
plebeian revolts of 19th-century Europe. Dismissed by scientific knowledge, his
theories confuted, their implication was maintained in the nexus between medicine
and criminology of which drugs policy is an especial field (though I am not aware
of Lombroso’s direct influence on Iranian criminologists). In this medico-political
frame, medical understanding enables a moral and political judgement, which
bestows upon scientific definitions (such as mental disorder, addiction, etc.)
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a clear classist character. The rigid categories of medical sciences enmesh with the
more ambiguous ones of human knowledge, in a classist plot clothed in a neutral,
technical language. The excitement of criminological reactions from the state vis-
a`-vis the homeless drug users is, in the words of British psychiatrist R.D. Laing,
‘a social fact which in turn it is a political event’ (cited in Basaglia, 1971: 168). I
shall now dwell more closely on the structural violence which has as its object the
dangerous class of drug addicts.
Over the decades following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the authorities
referred to unruly members of the suburbs with the derogatory term arazel va
owbash. Its meaning is vague, but anthropologist Shahram Khosravi suggests
that, since 2007, it has become a notion constructed in opposition to the romanti-
cised image of the louti, the gallant delinquent of the traditional neighbourhoods
surrounding the bazaar (2017: 104–5; Adelkhah, 2000). The etymology of arazel
can be traced back to the Arabic root ‘R-DH-L’, which indicates something ‘low’,
‘abject’; awbash instead stands for ‘riffraff’. Both are of Koranic derivation and of
utmost negative value. Updating the Marxist use in The Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Napoleon (2007 [1982]), of ‘social scum’, ‘rotting mass’ and ‘disintegrated
mass’, arazel va awbash can be synthetically translated as ‘lumpen’.
The law enforcement and political cadres of the Islamic Republic remained
vague on who exactly belonged to this multifarious group of dangerous individuals.
Those arrested for being arazel va awbash were systematically accused also of being
involved in drug dealing and/or being addicted. In the official discourse, being
connected to drugs triggered an association with a milieu of sexual depravity,
moral decadence, alcoholism, Satanism and zurguyi, ‘bullying’. The danger posed
by them is that of destabilising the moral order on which the Islamic Republic rests
its legitimacy. The lumpen people, unable to adapt to the engaged and moderniser
momentum of the post-war era (post-1989), risk contaminating its body politic.
From within they contaminate through physical and psychological deviancy:
addiction. From without, they contaminate as part of an ‘imperialist plot’ (toute’
este‘mari) aimed at undermining the Islamic Revolution, through the diffusion of
the westernised decadent lifestyle.
Since the early days of the 1979 revolution, addicted people have never been
regarded as deserving the compassion of the Islamist state. Rather than a result of
Islamic tenets and scriptures, the lack of compassion for drug ‘addicts’ stemmed
from secular moral considerations rooted in the anti-drug ideology of the early
20th century. Indeed, large-scale criminalisation had already been operating under
the Pahlavi Monarchy (1925–79), justified by the need for social and cultural mod-
ernisation (Ghiabi, 2018e). With the Islamic Revolution, anti-drug campaigns
acquired the terminology of anti-imperialism – drugs as an immoral western
import – and of moral cleansing of the newly revolutionary social body. Drug
users’ psyche and body were deemed at odds with the moral purity praised by
the clergy. That is why, during the 1980s, treatment of drug abusers was not pub-
licly available, since the official state strategy on addiction called for forced detoxi-
fication through incarceration and forced labour (Ghiabi, 2015).The targeting
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of plebeian classes is a development emerging out of the shift in governing cadres
and their political economy after the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88).
During the first years of the revolution, when Ayatollah Khomeini’s authority
remained unchallenged, the mosta’zafin (the Koranic term indicating the
‘disinherited’) was used in opposition to the capitalist, westernised class of the
mostakbarin (‘the arrogant’). Policies in favour of the poor and the urban prole-
tariat were legitimised as part of the promise of social revolution to which many
had pledged in 1979, amidst the revolutionary fervour (Bayat, 1994). The disin-
herited classes were directly inspired by Franz Fanon’s incitement to the Les
Damne´s de la Terre (The Wretched of the Earth, 1961), mediated through the
work of Iranian revolutionary intellectual Ali Shariati, who supported a sui generis
Islamic Liberation Theology. This legacy lasted up until the mid-1990s, when the
necessities of reconstruction implied shelving the populist love for the disinherited
in favour of developmental goals through investment and capital accumulation.
Today, governmental cadres are pledged to an implicit taboo on the use of populist
categories such as the mosta‘zafin.
Large-scale developmental programmes turned the capital Tehran into the
centre of economic gravity, a process that speeded up the already mass urbanisa-
tion caused by war displacement in the 1980s. The face of the drug phenomenon
had also mutated between the late 1990s and early 2000s, when HIV/AIDS, caused
by rising heroin injection, had become a material threat to the general population
(Christensen, 2011; Ghiabi, 2018a). A vast system of public health services had
been put in place for people seeking medical assistance in kicking their habit
(Ghiabi, 2018e). This shift towards a medicalised and more tolerant policy vis-a-
vis drug consumption and drug dependence has had ambivalent outcomes. Middle-
class drug users are provided with the choice of subsidised methadone treatment or
an array of in-patient centres which differ in methods and philosophy with regard
to ‘getting clean’. Drug users that have not the benefit of choice and, particularly,
homeless and vagrant drug users are situated in a zone in between punishment and
care (Ghiabi, 2018a), which highlights the structural violence which governs their
existences. Javad Sorkhe´’s (Red Javad) tale is testimony to this condition in the
Iranian setting.
A Javadi history of drugs6
Javad is a 32-year-old man. Born in Islamshahr, on the outskirts of Tehran, his
family left their village in the Central Region (Ostan-e Markazi) to move to Tehran
in the early 1970s. He is the oldest of five brothers and two sisters. Dropping out of
school during his teens, he has worked as a taxi driver in Shahr-e Rey, bus driver
assistant on the Tehran-Qom line, and petty drug dealer over the last 15 years.
Opium was a formative element in his family life. His father and mother were both
heavy opium users and by the age of 16 Javad himself had acquired a taste for
opium, hashish and later, with his companions, heroin. His story is reminiscent of
that of many young men in the lumpen city. Unemployment, illegal employment,
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family crisis, prison, disease, violence and drug abuse. All of these, he reiterates,
impeded Javad’s attempt to get married: ‘no girl wanted the son of an addict’, ‘no
girl wants someone without a future’, ‘all the girls look out for the rich kids’, ‘if you
marry someone from here [the neighbourhood] it ought to be from a desperate
family; I got enough desperation myself’. The death of his father put further pres-
sure on him to sustain the family: ‘it was enough for our hand to reach our mouth,
but drugs need money and we, mashallah, are all [drug] consumers!’
Unable to do so through the legal economy, which remained stagnant for
unskilled manual labourers facing the cheaper labour of Afghan migrants who
arrived in the 1980s, he is thrown into the informal market of smuggled goods
and petty dealing: ‘I had a job, it was working out, then I got in some troubles with
the man running the business and I was kicked out; then I got another job but
hammash khomar budam, I was always high, couldn’t get my shit together’, ‘it was
dangerous but I made enough to have my stuff and help my mom’. After a couple
of years, ‘I got caught because some of the kids gave my name to get one year
instead of five, that’s how it works’. On this line, he cites Hich Kas, the Iranian
rapper he knows I listen to too, in the song Ekhtelaf [Difference/Disagreement/
Conflict]: ‘inja jangale´, bokhor ta khorde´ nashi’ [Here is the jungle, eat not to be
eaten!]. His words triggered in my mind the song’s following two lines, which I
thought described the situation more closely: ‘Ekhtelaf-e tabaqati inja bi-dad
mikone´, bu-ye mardom-e zakhmi adamo bimar mikone´’ [Class difference oppresses
this place, the smell of wounded people sickens].
Figure 3. Map of Tehran’s drug hotspots.
Source: Ghiabi, 2018d.
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During the period I met Javad, he smoked heroin and shisheh. The first is a downer
(opiate), the other a powerful stimulant, an upper. His meth habit produced great
mobility in the city, new encounters, more efficient work/rest balance, but also
increased paranoia and volatile relationships. His reactions to ordinary events, he
confessed, had become more aggressive and he had lost the capacity ‘to wait’ (cf.
Khosravi, 2017). Javad would purchase a few suts (1/10 of a gramme) and smoke it
while on a stroll around town. In his ownway, Javad is a plebeianflaˆneur of themodern
city, his existence being present in the city mass but differently from his 19th-century
equivalents, the 21st-century flaˆneur is speedy and is no gentleman.7 Unproductive,
unemployed, he has nonetheless unparalleled knowledge of urban life and landscape,
whereas the flanerie of the wealthy rolls exclusively on the wheels of fancy cars.Moving
from South to North, by collective taxis, scooters, metro and walking, the presence of
plebeian flaˆneurs is increasingly visible in modern Tehran (Figure 3).
It would not be unusual for Javad to stop on a pedestrian bridge overlooking
one of Tehran’s highways. He would take out his glass pipe and torch lighter,
inhale with a deep breath, holding in, blowing out, before putting everything
back in his pocket. In one occasion, he confessed: ‘My body is used to morphine,
tarkib-am morfini-e´, my structure is morphine-like but this [shisheh] turns on my
brain. Otherwise I’m lost’. With meth, he felt motivated to stroll across the city,
beyond his usual neighbourhood, wandering. On the back seat of his friends’
motorbikes, on public services, he and his friends reasserted their presence
in areas of Tehran outside their class-based domain. The unremarkable heroin
smoker who moved his body only in order to hustle enough to keep his habit
going had now become a remarkable urban presence. Accounts in the newspapers
about shisheh smokers acting volatilely across the capital mushroomed throughout
the 2010s (Khabaronline, 2014; Jam-e Jam, 2017; ISNA, 2014).
Javad was sentenced to prison on several occasions. Twice for petty dealing,
once for thuggery. Meanwhile he developed a taste for heroin, which he smoked
with the kids (bacche-ha), while killing time in southern Tehran. In prison, he
needed heroin to avoid the heavy withdrawal symptoms, so he reverted to sharing
heroin with other inmates through a self-made pump or in signing up on metha-
done substitution programmes. ‘Thank God, I did not get AIDS! But I had no
other solution there’, he confesses while we walk around Harandi Park. Once out
of prison he failed to find a stable dwelling and spent time wandering from parks to
friends’ flats to the compulsory treatment camps to public methadone clinics.
Treatment came always against his will following police arrests in one of the
collection plans against drug addicts and the arazel.
I ask: ‘Why did the police arrest you? They keep saying ‘‘addiction is a medical
issue’’, ‘‘the addict is a person with a disease’’, ‘‘we provide treatment for the
addict’’ and then someone like you gets caught every two months.’ His response
was telling of lumpen awareness of structural drug violence:
You know how the police work. Every now and then, the commander of some police
unit decides that the statistics of crime are low, so the police captain comes to the
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office and says, ‘today I want 100 criminals’. So the easiest way to get this number is to
raid a patoq and you can get as many as you like. They do you the [addiction] test and
then send you to a [treatment] camp for one, two, three months. . . The addict is easy
to get, so you know it’s convenient for them. Newspapers talk about us. The rich feel
more secure. The shop owners sell more. Treatment centres get their subsidies. Even
the dealers take a break so the price goes up. And us? Khob, well, we get fucked!
Clear evidence of the systematic use of the addicts as a useful expedient to increase
policing records are difficult to obtain. But a quick look at the number of people
incarcerated or referred to state-run treatment centres (mandatory treatment) over
the last decades provides the reader with a telling picture. In 1989, the number of
drug offenders in prison totalled c. 60,000. Ten years later it had reach 210,000 and
in 2001 around 250,000.8 This steady increase of arrests is only partly justified by
the more efficient anti-narcotics enforcement of the police. Javad’s arrest following
his last prison term did not entail a specific crime, except for being a ‘dangerous
addict’, i.e. living at street level. He wasn’t arrested for dealing drugs or smuggling
illicit goods. He recollects being taken to a mandatory treatment camp, the notori-
ously violent Shafaq camp (Ghiabi, 2018a), at least on four occasions. ‘You get
arrested together with a hundred other people and you end up in a place where you
‘‘detoxify’’ for a few weeks. Some people are happy about this especially when it
gets colder in December and January. A warm place to stay for a few weeks and
then you can get back at your place, in the park, anywhere, after Nouruz [the
Iranian new year on 21 March]’, when the weather is milder. His account is not
isolated and I had confirmation of this in the stories of other individuals.
Reports of homeless drug users – or simply vagrant paupers – freezing to death
in Tehran’s cold winters are not sporadic. While carrying out fieldwork in the
Farahzad patoq, there were several reports of homeless users falling asleep in the
valley and freezing to death. Dying in a patoq does not carry a public signature –
the vagrant’s death is an event with no sign – except for statistical data on drug
deaths. It is a circumstantial event accompanying the journey from the bare life of
the homeless addict to their bare death (Comaroff, 2007: 197), bare inasmuch it
does not leave a trace – no signature – in public life. The overlapping of life and
death in the existence of lumpen drug users is considered a consequence of the
illegibility of this category: not fitting in the scheme of state-society life, their
existence and non-existence blur into each other. Many homeless drug users, espe-
cially when belonging to far-away rural regions or to ethnic minorities including
that of Afghan undocumented migrants, lack proper identification. Inability to
provide the ID card means finding oneself in a limbo vis-a`-vis the most basic
needs, such as health, education, housing and welfare. It is the case of the children
of many foreign fathers (especially Afghans), but also to many street drug users
who amidst the unsettledness of their existence have lost track of their papers. With
no identification, treatment/incarceration can be extended for longer periods.
The homeless, bi-khaneh or kartonkhab, exemplifies a case of khanemansuzi, a
Persian expression used to describe the impact of drugs on people’s lives. It means
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‘burning one’s house down’ and it captures the status of the homeless drug users
beyond the metaphor. It suggests the abandonment in which homeless users exist,
disconnected from family (which in the Iranian context is the foundational ethical
site for social integration). The drug user, who has lost his/her dwelling, is equiva-
lent to a sans papiers, someone who cannot be recognised, whose identity is trou-
bling. In order to exist, he/she must pursue a life outside formal order to avoid
being incarcerated or deported. To follow on the metaphor of khanemansuzi, the
dwellings of street addicts become the kharabat, the ‘ruins’, the image used in
Persian poetry to describe the wine tavern, the bandits’ nest, the sacred refuge,
the utmost disrupted site of the soul.
Metaphors are abundant in lumpen life and they often bear empirical value.
‘We are in Barzakh’ Hamid tells me, another ‘experienced’ (his word) drug user
from Darvazeh Ghar. ‘They take us, set us free, re-take us, it’s like a game’.
Barzakh indicates the Islamic Limbo, the place where men and women wait at
the end of time before God’s judgement. The Limbo, however, has its material
grounds or, to put it crudely, graves. In November 2016, a shocking report in
Shahrvand, showed groups of more than 50 homeless drug users living and sleeping
in the graveyards of Nasirabad, on the Tehran-Saveh highway. Gathered in this
cemetery, with piles of cartons, plastic bags and wood, they occupied around
20 graves. Two to four people live in each of the sepulchres where they burn
wood to warm up in the freezing temperatures of the Iranian plateau. Gurkhabi,
‘sleeping in graves’, became the new public trope which caused the piety and com-
passion of social media users. The Oscar-winning director Asghar Farhadi even
wrote a letter to President Hassan Rouhani, demanding that the government inter-
vene with urgency.
Living in graves is indeed a powerful image in the public eye (Figure 4).
Homeless users turn sacred, spiritual places, such as the shrine in Farahzad
described in the opening section, into profane surroundings of human decadence.
The cemetery too is stripped of its quiet and meditative dimension where ordinary
people bring their sorrows. It is now a place of destitution of lumpen lives, the
graves of the dead inhabited by precarious addicts. Yet, graves are safer and
warmer places, ‘to avoid policing and the cold’, as a man in treatment in Shahr-
e Rey explained. This is not an Iranian oddity. In Cairo, for instance, the dwellers
in the ashawiyyat, the informal residences in Cairo’s huge cemetery, enjoy better
conditions than those who live in the city’s crowded suburbs. Access to facilities,
better connection to the city and insularity from state encroachment guarantee a
safer existence (Bayat, 1997). Although the ‘gravesleepers of Nasirabad’ did not
establish informal settlements like their Cairene equivalents, they too found them-
selves in a precarious, but safer, condition than those other homeless users in the
parks or under the bridges. Following the report of grave sleeping, the police
intervened in the cemetery and rounded up all the homeless drug users residing
there. They were taken to a compulsory treatment camp. Once released, almost all
of them continued using drugs. Their new residence, in many cases, became the
surrounding deserts of Nasirabad (Vaqaye‘ Ettefaqiyeh, 2017).
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Structure and agency in the lumpen economy
Objects of a systemic violence that denies them a place to exist, homeless drug users
live in a political economy of their own, made up of charity, hustling and sharing.
The centre of gravity of philanthropic endeavours for the urban proletariat and
homeless drug users is Darvazeh Ghar. Its name – which in Persian has a mysteri-
ous allure: ghar means ‘cave’ – is said to derive from an episode in which one of the
sons of the Imam Musa al-Kazem, the seventh Shi’a Imam, while fleeing the
officials of the government, took refuge in a cave and, as is often the case with
Shi’a leaders, disappeared (Masjed Jamei, 2016). Over the 20th century, informal
settlements dug in the ground and called gowd represented the most populated
quarters of the area. The gowds hosted mostly brick makers who, given the lack
of housing land, created their homes by digging in the ground. By the 1990s, under
the Rafsanjani government, the gowds had disappeared, making way for a new
urban project. The gowd-e ma‘sumi became Harandi Park; gowd-e arab-ha,
Baharan Garden; gowd-e anvari, Khajavi Kermani Park; and gowd-e Khalu
Qanbar was replaced by Haqqani Park.
The four parks together are the centre of gravity of lumpen drug use in Tehran
(Figure 5, 6 and 7). The parks and green spaces, carefully promoted by the Tehran
municipality, have become dwellings for homeless drug users – hence ‘no-go zones’
for children and families. Shops and trades in these areas protest against their
presence, which transforms ‘decent neighbourhoods’ into lumpen citadels. ‘We
Figure 4. Front-page of Shahrvand: ‘Life in the Grave’.
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don’t sell anything except nakh ‘oqabi [one fag of Winston Red, popular brand for
homeless and hashish smokers]’ laments a shop owner in Darvazeh Ghar. He adds
‘Even mothers who come here buy just half a kilo of lentils; no yogurt, no milk.
Here, harf-e avvalo e‘tiyad dare! [Here, addiction runs the place!]’.
The genealogic presence of lumpen life is a durable trait of the neighbourhood,
which in recent years has also seen large philanthropic activities. The presence of
civil society groups had in fact become central in this area and public attention had
reached its zenith when in autumn 2015 several groups of volunteers, humanitarian
groups and philanthropic citizens started to bring cooked meals and clothes to the
park and distributed them among the drug users. I happened to be in the neigh-
bourhood during a few of these instances. Well-dressed women who attended char-
itable events taking place in the area would often take large pots of rice and stew
and distribute them in the park. The courtesy, as it happened, provoked skirmishes
and fights among the numerous homeless people in the park, who attempted to
secure a warm, often sophisticated, Persian dish. Some of the women remained
baffled by the violent scenes and would soon walk – if not run – out of the park.
Despite the incident, the area witnessed a steady increase in charitable work. A few
months later, a charity organisation started to paint across Iranian cities, starting
from Tehran, ‘walls of kindness’ (divar-e mehrabani), encouraging Tehranis – and
Figure 5. ‘Marathon’ in Harandi Park. Photo by author.
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later all fellow Iranians – to bring warm clothes, food and other essential items for
those in need.
The provision of food and clothes had become also a matter of satire. Detractors
hold that ‘the drug addicts are no longer satisfied by bread and egg or bread and
cheese, but they expect sophisticated food and are spoiled for choice’ (Sharq, 2015).
Others claimed that public attention is driven by a sentimental piety not grounded
in a real understanding of the complex situation of drug addiction, especially in the
Harandi area. In the words reported by a piece on Sharq (2015), this humanitarian
approach was a type of ‘addict-nurturing [mo‘tadparvari]’. Another public official
cynically suggested that the provision of food might well be a stratagem used by
providers of addiction treatment centres to attract people to their facilities and,
incidentally, attract public funding to their organisations.
On 9 October 2015 I was invited to attend the ‘First Marathon of Recovered
Female Drug Addicts’ organised by the House of Sun (khaneh-ye khorshid),
an event which took place across the four parks of Harandi, Razi, Baharan and
Shush (Figure 5 and 6). On the edge of Harandi Park’s southern corner, the House
of Sun has been active for over two decades in providing free-of-charge services and
support to female drug users and those women seeking refuge. A large crowd of
women (and some men) attended the opening ceremony of the marathon and
waited for the start of this seemingly sporting event. Two female players of the
Iranian national football team led a collective session of gymnastic activities, a way
Figure 6. Left: football players from the Iranian National Team; right: a former homeless
addict chanting at the marathon. Photo by author.
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to symbolically recover the body of the park from the sight of widespread drug use
and destitution. Truth be told, the event revealed itself to be not a marathon – not
even close – but rather a public demonstration that brought more than a thousand
women and their sympathetic supporters (like myself) to march inside the park and
in the middle of the gathering of drug users, among whom there were dozens of
women. The term ‘marathon’, I thought, was probably used to get around the
politicisation of the event in the eyes of the municipality, which could have
regarded a women-led march against drugs as too sensitive a topic.
Leila Arshad (aka Lily), the main organiser of the event and director of the
House of Sun, had long been working in this neighbourhood. While those attend-
ing the marathon had gathered in the courtyard of the NGO, she held the micro-
phone and said, ‘one of our objectives is to catch the attention of the public officials
and people towards your problems: lack of employment, absent housing, insurance
and treatment, respect and social inclusion’. A few weeks following the marathon,
a group of 40 men raided the informal camp in Harandi Park, set on fire several
tents, and attacked a number of street drug users with sticks and clubs. The muni-
cipality declared that the attack was perpetrated ‘by the people’, denying any
responsibility. Others hinted at the lack of responsiveness of the police (Etemad-e
Melli, 2015). Notwithstanding this occurrence, the attitude of Iranians towards
charity has changed significantly over the years. Mendicancy, begging and petty
vending is accepted less for God’s sake and more in exchange for merchandise or
services (Asfari, 2016). Philanthropy itself has transmuted and has lost its Islamic
framework and become more market-oriented. The observation comes to mind of
Figure 7. Harandi Park: street vendors, street addicts. Photo by author.
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Italian psychiatrist (and reformer) Franco Basaglia who, while visiting New York,
noticed on the metro line an advertisement: ‘Which of these human tragedies do
you prefer? Vietnam, Biafra, the Arab-Israeli controversy, the black ghettos,
hunger in India . . .? Choose yours and help, helping the Red Cross’ (Basaglia,
1971: 71). Despite the rise of philanthropy in favour of homeless drug users, the
economy of lumpen drug users does not rely on charity exclusively. To get by, most
street users find ways of making a living in creative and painful ways, as the case of
Reza epitomises.
Reza comes from a well-off family, but he was expelled from his wife’s house
because he was addicted to morphine. He now lives in a small room rented in the
south of Tehran, where he carries on his morphine use, plus smoking meth.
Recently he signed up to a methadone substitution programme and he is now
trying to get off both drugs. He speaks frankly with me (while I often found him
lying to the NGO workers with whom he sometime volunteers): ‘I still do shisheh
when I visit some old friends; now I’m selling some used stuff which I bartered
with a guy. It’s a good deal, I’m happy’. Most of the time, he repairs old watches,
lighters, mobile phones and resells them in the informal markets across Tehran or
to other drug users he encounters along his path. The situations in which
he carries on his business comply with the ruthless rule of capital. ‘Hey dash
Reza! What’s up? Did you make enough money from ripping me off the other
day? You came and took my watch when I was lying on the ground half-dead,
didn’t you?’ shouts a man while we walk in one of the parks. Reza walks straight
past without paying attention to the man and explains to me, ‘he begged me
to buy it, now he regrets it? Be man che´, why should I care?’ Drug users on a
high or with heavy withdrawal symptoms can be good sellers out of euphoria or
of desperate need. Reza’s mind works quickly and he is always busy doing some-
thing, whether handling some tech product he bought or calling people to set up
meetings, reunions and barter sessions. His economic existence as well as that of
many other pauperised drug users fits in the category of ‘jobs without definition’
(Bhatt in Denning, 2010: 89). Yet it is about work that one is speaking and not
charity or theft, although stolen goods are just as good in this economy.
Chemical calibration was an expedient that Reza used to be more productive.
Mobility and focus helped him not to get lost in the dregs of narcotic dependence.
The practice, a leitmotif in my discussions with homeless users, is also common in
other types of employment. Female drug users face a higher risk in the illegal
market of drugs. Their bodies are an exchange product when monetary capital is
absent. Hence, many sex workers make use of methamphetamine (and to a lesser
extent heroin) to provide better sexual experience to their clients. It is sometimes
the case that the client requires the sex worker to consume the drug in company
before sexual intercourse. Meth is a powerful sexual inhibitor and it triggers sexual
impulse where desire is absent or recalcitrant. Drugs help to cope with the pain and
danger of sexual commerce and, in that way, sex working is likelier to pave the way
to a strong addiction. Ali Cheraq-qovveh (Ali ‘Torch’), another young man with
whom I carried out my fieldwork, discussed drugs and sex with me, while telling me
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about his attempts at recovery:
I learnt a lot because of my drug use, I went to many places, I met many girls, who
otherwise I wouldn’t have been able to meet. They didn’t have money and were ready
to give themselves in exchange for drugs, or did not have a place to use and since I had
a room, they would ask me to come there to use and spend time with me. Money,
I didn’t have much, but I had a place and the drugs. At the time, a lot of heroin passed
through my hands and I got some cuts on it, posht-am garm bud, I was on the safe side.
But I never dared to take advantage of these girls, I used to tell them, ‘if you don’t
have money come and use with me, but don’t sell yourself, I can share it with you’.
It was nice to have some female company anyway so I didn’t mind.
Mohsen’s kindness was perhaps a way to keep his reputation clean with me. But his
narrative holds water:
I always kept in consideration God, even during the period when I only used drugs,
when I would beg to get the money, I would still share the drugs with those who
couldn’t afford it. I was a boy, I could collect rubbish, I could beg, but a girl, can she
collect rubbish? Can she beg for money without risk? In these times of ours a girl who
asks for money to anyone can be taken away, don’t you know?
The gendered dimension of lumpen life puts female drug users from poor back-
grounds in the open market of sex and drugs. In this context, sharing is caring and
may imply sexual concessions or friendship, whether to avoid the risk of using in
public (when one’s safe space is narrow) or to extract enough capital to sustain
one’s drug consumption. Sharing, however, is part of the political economy of drug
use also in that it establishes lasting bonds of mutuality – at the risk of contagious
diseases such as hepatitis and HIV (Bourgois, 2009). Sharing one’s drug with a
companion who lacks the means to buy some or is physically impaired means that
the favour might be paid back one rainy day.
The economic life of lumpen drug users is made of daily expediencies, such as
barter, repairing, collecting abandoned objects, selling minimal items, begging and
resorting to charity. It is a diverse ecosystem which changes according to personal
and structural conditions. The use of drugs is not mechanically experienced and
driven by a deus ex machina called ‘addiction’. It is based on what I call ‘chemical
calibration’, for instance in the use of shisheh as a productive drug to hustling and
heroin as a tranquillizer and painkiller amid sheer destitution. Philanthropy is just
one side of the lumpen economy in the city.
Epilogue
If you want to know what it means to be poor, you have to get involved and mix with
the poor, if you want to know what is an addict, you have to mix with them. One
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doesn’t know about drugs, take him for a month to the meetings of NA [Narcotic
Anonymous], or to a treatment camp. Sir ta piazesho bebine´. Mazi, you’ve got this
work on the addicts, you come from Oxford, you’re cool and know all the numbers.
Now you want to understand how desperate people live? You need to get destroyed in
it [khurd besham] to understand the life of a desperate addict.
Mohsen’s incitement to immerse myself in the discourse of addiction, poverty and
dangerous life was powerful methodological advice which seconded my theoretical
approach ‘from below’ and my decision to go ethnographic. This perspective
debunks knowledge gathered from elite interviews and epidemiological interpret-
ation of drug abuse, which represent a good deal of studies into drug phenomena,
including in Iran where epidemiology is the standard approach in drug studies.
Top-down approaches, albeit articulated and linear, eventually reproduce bour-
geois images and tropes, their panic, facing lumpen life. Lumpen life as seen from
below reassesses the structural violence, classist xenophobia and everyday agency
at work in the dangerous existences of people in danger.
In the first part of the article, I discussed how structural violence conditions and
is conditioned by the everyday existence of homeless or precarious drug users. By
letting the voice of people I carried out fieldwork with ‘speak’ about their daily
occurrences, desires and expedients, I portrayed an entryway into the addiction and
anti-narcotic assemblage. Imprecise, messy and disorderly, lumpen narratives – I
believe – fill in the gap, with some meaning, between the attempt at theory and the
empirical existences as captured though the ethnographic gaze. By showing the
ecologies in which this group lives and who is part of it, the argument lingered
on the structural violence of which this group is victim. This assemblage is made of
their shanty dwellings – valleys, parks, graves – and the institutions of internment –
prison, rehab, and morgue. Eventually, I described the economic activities that
enable lumpen life by exploring the combination of agency and philanthropy. It
is this panoramic view that invites the reader at an inductive approach to know-
ledge, which is in part a secondment of the ethnographic method that drives the
analysis. On this ground, the narrative of the lumpen drug users can be revelatory
of the faultlines and rationales that, in praxis, govern ‘addiction’ and the making of
the poor into a dangerous class. Their fantasises, desires and pain – and even lies –
may hold truths well beyond the word of the law and the statistical records of
politico-medical agents. It might be the case that, as Michael Taussig has sug-
gested, ‘not the basic truths, not the Being nor the ideologies of the center, but
the fantasies of the marginalised concerning the secret of the center are what is
most politically important to the State idea and hence State fetishism.’ (Taussig,
1992: 132).
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Notes
1. The term ‘addict’ is of problematic use and, in this article, I opt for a different termin-
ology, where possible. I use the term ‘addict’ to report the way authorities refer to drug
users and/or drug users refer to themselves. Discussion of the terminology is given ample
consideration throughout the text of the article.
2. Shelter in Persian.
3. Based on the exchange rate in 2016.
4. For a historical ethnography of how drug consumption contributes to the production of
space, see Ghiabi (2018d).
5. The fieldwork for this project was approved by Department of Politics and International
Relations at the University of Oxford in winter 2014. Research between 2012 and 2014
was carried out via interview with officials and archival research, including over a three-
month period as an intern at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Tehran.
All individuals appearing in this text have been anonymised.
6. Javad is the quintessential plebeian name in Iran. Something or someone who is ‘javadi’
means ‘that belongs to a popular class’, ‘to the village’, or simply ‘poor’.
7. For a more intellectual approach to flaˆneur and narcotics, see Benjamin (1997, 2006).
8. Unpublished statistics, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Tehran [Excel file].
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